From: Neil Foster <Neil.Foster@newcastle.edu.au>
To: keith.rowley@unlv.edu
CC: obligations@uwo.ca
Date: 25/05/2011 00:04:37 UTC
Subject: Re: ODG: Property in gametes

Dear Keith;
I see Katy has already commented very well on the facts of this particular case. On your more general question, I have to say I would be very dubious as to whether a statute that referred to "the unborn young of animals" could really be interpreted to include human unborn. While the OED or other dictionaries may include "humans" among "animals", I find it very hard to believe that the drafters of the UCC intended to do so. On general principles this means that the legislation does not cover the situation, I would have thought.
Your question about security interests in gametes etc, however, raises very interesting questions which I am not aware of being addressed in Australian law. You may be aware that the Federal government here has recently enacted the  Personal Property Securities Act 2009 (Cth)- in certain cases the validity of security interests in such property will now depend on their registration on the “Personal Property Securities Register”. (I gather the Act is not due to properly commence until Oct 2011.) "Personal property" under the definition in s 10 effectively means all property except land, unless explicitly excluded by the legislation. Section 8 does not mention property interests in human tissue. Nor is it excluded under the Personal Property Securities Regulations 2010. Because the courts for so many years have taken the view that products of the human body were not "property", it seems the legislation has ignored the issue. I imagine it will not come up very often. But it might be wise to think about the implications.
Regards
Neil

 
On 25/05/2011, at 4:50 AM, keith.rowley@unlv.edu wrote:

This holding troubles me unless the deceased husband consented (prior to his death, obviously) to having his sperm extracted post mortem.  I'm no property guru; but, absent that consent, I would argue that the deceased has the paramount right to his own remains (and dignity).  Now, if a state or country had a law permitting post mortem organ/tissue/blood/bodily fluids harvesting in the public good, I might think differently about the deceased's rights -- unless a person has the opportunity before death to opt out of having her or his organs harvested post mortem and this deceased opted out.
 
*     *     *
 
Neil's post raises another quandary that I've been pondering periodically.  The Uniform Commercial Code defines "goods" to include "the unborn young of animals."  See UCC §§ 2-105(1) & 9-102(a)(44).  Neither UCC Article 2, which governs sales of goods, nor UCC Article 9, which governs security interests in, inter alia, goods, defines "animals."  Surely, humans are animals: the most upright-walking, biggest-brained (relative to body size) mammals on the planet.  Therefore, just as surely, gestating humans or gestating humans-to-be (depending on one's notion of when -- at conception, at birth, or somewhere in between -- human life begins) are "the unborn young of animals."  Likewise, just as a human animal may sell or grant a security interest in some of her postage stamp collection or her sporting goods; she may, at least in theory, sell or grant a security interest in some of her body (e.g., a cornea, a kidney) and its product (e.g., blood, an ovum).  As such (although surely it was not the intention of either Article 2's drafters or Article 9's drafters), absent contrary preemptive law, UCC Article 2 governs -- and permits -- the sale of unborn humans, body parts, and bodily products and UCC Article 9 governs -- and permits -- security interests in them.
 
Section 1 of the 13th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution ("Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.") preempts selling born humans and may preempt taking a security interest in born humans; but it says nothing about unborn persons, body parts, or bodily products.  Section 1 of the 14th Amendment entitles "[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States" to "due process of law" before any state may deprive that person of "life, liberty, or property."  Again, nothing about unborn persons, body parts, or bodily products -- except that the 14th Amendment may prohibit the state from depriving a person of an unborn human (would this only apply to the biological female who carries the unborn human?) or a body part without due process of law.  Most or all U.S. states allow a person to sell a quantity of human blood, plasma, or semen.  Most or all U.S. states prohibit or strictly regulate selling viable human fetuses or human body parts (pre- or post-mortem).  I don't know what position state or federal non-UCC law takes on selling fertilized human eggs.  Neither federal nor any state's law, as far as I am aware, expressly permits or prohibits granting a security interest in unborn persons, body parts, or bodily products.
 
Does Australian, Canadian, English, Irish, New Zealand, Scots, Welsh, or other law known to anyone on this list deal with granting or enforcing a security interest in an unborn person, a human body part, or a human bodily product?
 
Thanks for any insights you can offer on- or off-list.
 
Best wishes,
 
Keith 
 
Keith A. Rowley
William S. Boyd Professor of Law
William S. Boyd School of Law
University of Nevada Las Vegas
4505 S. Maryland Parkway, Box 451003
Las Vegas, NV 89154-1003
Tel: (702) 895-4993
Fax: (702) 895-2482
E-mail: keith.rowley@unlv.edu

 

 

Chair, AALS Section on Contracts
Past Chair, AALS Section on Commercial and Related Consumer Law
Developments Reporter, ABA Business Law Section, UCC Committee

 



-----Neil Foster <Neil.Foster@newcastle.edu.au> wrote: -----

To: obligations@uwo.ca
From: Neil Foster <Neil.Foster@newcastle.edu.au>
Date: 05/23/2011 10:44PM
Subject: ODG: Property in gametes

Dear Colleagues;
Even though it is only a decision at trial level, I thought others might be interested (since I recall we had some interest in the Yearworth decision a while ago) in a recent decision in the NSW Supreme Court holding that a widow who had requested extraction of semen from her recently deceased husband, was entitled to possession of the semen. A very careful judgment with a good review of Australian and UK decisions: Jocelyn Edwards; Re the estate of the late Mark Edwards [2011] NSWSC 478 (18 April 2011) http://www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au/action/PJUDG?jgmtid=152086. In the end concludes (having accepted on authority of Doodeward , and regarding Yearworth as persuasive, that the semen could be "property") that the widow's right to possession arose because there was no-one else in the world with a better claim:

[91]....[I]n my view Ms Edwards is the only person in whom an entitlement to property in the deceased's sperm would lie. The deceased was her husband. The sperm was removed on her behalf and for her purposes. No-one else in the world has any interest in them. My conclusion is that, subject to what follows, it would be open to the Court to conclude that Ms Edwards is entitled to possession of the sperm.

Regards
Neil


Neil Foster,
Senior Lecturer,
Deputy Head of School & LLB Program Convenor,
Newcastle Law School,
Faculty of Business & Law.
MC158, McMullin Building,
University of Newcastle, Callaghan NSW 2308 AUSTRALIA 
ph 02 4921 7430
fax 02 4921 6931










Neil Foster,
Senior Lecturer,
Deputy Head of School & LLB Program Convenor,
Newcastle Law School,
Faculty of Business & Law.
MC158, McMullin Building,
University of Newcastle, Callaghan NSW 2308 AUSTRALIA 
ph 02 4921 7430
fax 02 4921 6931